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Recently, 1in.am published an article entitled “The Choice between NATO vs. CSTO Value Systems is an Issue on the Political Agenda”. The article, as is clear from the title, elaborates on the issue which is often discussed: eventually which military block should we join?

The article presents the opinion of the chairman of Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor, Artur Sakunts, who believes that Armenia should choose the option of joining NATO and should withdraw itsmembership from CSTO.

Judging from the article, Mr. Sakunts does not comprehend the scale and essence of the issue. Particularly, he states: “…the reforms in Armed Forces, which are inevitable, cannot cause an increase of military expenses.”However, It is not clear how it is guaranteed that the expenses would not increase as a result of reforms. For instance, since the beginning of reforms, the military expenses of neighboring Georgia has multiplied. Thus the total military expenses in Georgia for all power structures were $ 83.7 million in 2004, while in 2005 they were already $ 117 million, in 2006 $ 527 million and in 2008 and 2009 they reached $ 1.043 billion and $ 0.99 billion respectively.

If we are speaking about reforms in the context of NATO membership, then the increase of expenses is a more likely scenario, as Armenia will have to match the NATO standards.(in terms of caliber first of all). This means that, eventually, the army will have to completely re-arm, even change cartridges, and this presumes additional military expenses.In that case, in order to reduce the military expenses Armenia will have to dramatically reduce the number of armed forces and weapons even lower than the threshold set by the CFE Treaty.

Membership with NATO and switching to its standards will bring about another serious issue: the incompatibility of the arms of the RA AF with the NKR DA.

It is clear that the Republic of Artsakh can neither join NATO nor obtain western ammunition, even with Armenia’s factoring. Consequently, we are going to have two armies with significantly different weapons. Moreover, the infrastructures necessary for maintaining those weapons will also be different.

It should be noted that Russian and especially Soviet weapons are generally cheaper than their western equivalents, and due to CSTO, Armenia was able to buy them for less than the market price. Those who wish can compare how much Armenia paid for S-300PT/PS Systems and how much is, for instance, the American Patriot System.

The next is the distressful issue of the violations of the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It is an important fact, that neither the CFE Treaty nor other documents associated with it restrict military expenses. It is also important that there have been many amendments and additions to the CFE Treaty that should be addressed separately.

Sakunts rightly states that the CFE Treaty was signed in 1990, when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact still existed. In essence, the treaty reflects the realities of the cold war.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were attempts to adapt the treaty to the new reality. Particularly, in May 1992, the agreement “On the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the CFE Treaty” was signed in Tashkent (Tashkent Agreement), by which the countries allocated the commitments undertaken by the USSR under the CFE Treaty. The agreement was signed by Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine;however Azerbaijan and Georgia did not ratify it. Therefore, it did not go into effect, because, according to Article 12 of the agreement, it would enter into effect 10 days after the ratification. TheBaltic States did not sign the Tashkent Agreement at all. It should be noted that although the Tashkent Agreement did not enter into effect, the parties de facto carry out their commitments underthe treaty.

On July 10, 1992, the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed.

Next, the Vienna Document was signed on November 16, 1999, in Istanbul(yes, in Istanbul), and was binding for all parties. This document did not need ratification.

Then, the Agreement “On Adaptation of the CFE Treaty”, was signed on November 19, 1999 in Istanbul.The treaty was signed by 30 states but was ratified only by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Thus this agreement did not go into effect.

In this situation, Russia terminated its participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007, justifying this step by the fact that the agreement on adaptation was not ratified by the countries who signed it, particularly the NATO member countries.

Several days ago, in response to Russia’s stance, the United States and Great Britain declared that they were terminating the information exchange within the framework of the CFE Treaty (although it is not clear whether this refers only to Russia or they are completely terminating the CFE Treaty).

Armenia carries out its commitments undertaken under CFE Treaty (including the Tashkent Agreement, which as we said, did not enter into effect,but is generally observed by the participant countries) and the 1999 Vienna Document, including allowing inspection visits and exchange of information with other parties.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the CFE Treaty is not viable. The reason is that, as I said, the CFE Treaty initially reflected the realities of the Cold War; whereas in today’s world, the challenges and military threats are different. While the USSR existed, the world was preparing for a global war and the restrictions were set between the two conflicting blocks (NATO-Warsaw Pact) to prevent war. Today, there is no threat of global war, but instead there are threats of local wars, the prevention of which requires completely different agreements.

Thus, for instance, under the Tashkent Agreement, Armenia and Georgia do not have the right to possess more that 220 tanks and 270 artillery pieces, while Turkey has concentrated the military units (1st, 9th, 12th, 14th, and 25thautomatic and the 4th tank brigade) of the 9th Military Corps of the 3rd Field Army on the border with Armenia. The number of tanks in this unit is between 350 and 370, and the number of artillery pieces is 700. This amount is already more than Armenia is allowed to have. Moreover, in 2-3 weeks,Turkey is able to concentrate 600-700 tanks and 1200-1300 artillery pieceson the Armenian border, using the 4th Military Corps of the 3rd FieldArmy, the other military units of the 9th Military Corps, and the 8th Military Corps of the 2nd Field Army. (These numbers should not be confused with the total armament possessed by Turkey, this is only the armament concentrated on the border with Armenia).

Georgia has a similar issue as well. There are approximately 369 tanks and 1096 artillery pieces, including 10 multi-barreled weapons on the Southern Military District of Russia. It is obvious that observing the requirements of the CFE Treaty does not originate from the security interests of Armenia and Georgia. We can surely insist that there is a need for a completely new and comprehensive treaty in response to contemporary European challenges.

As to the issue of value systems raised in the article, are all the NATO member countries in the same value field? Let me bring the example of neighboring Turkey. This country has demonstrated multiple times that it is not a bearer of European Values; recall the denial of the Armenian Genocide, the blockade of Armenia, the occupation of Northern Cyprus, persecution of Kurds, legislative restrictions on freedom of speech and conscience. That is to say the long-term membership to NATO did not lead to Turkey’s ‘Europeanization.’

The Baltic States are not perfect either, where even worshiping the fascist past is government supported, and the Nazi “SS”, which is considered a criminal organization by the international community, is highly esteemed. To prove, here is a picture taken in Afghanistan, which depicts a joint group of Ukrainian-Lithuanian combat engineerson a vehicle belonging to the Lithuanian Armed Forces, with the infamous “SS” logo. In terms of the value systems, let me remind you that in Germany, the fascist symbol is prohibited by law.

This means that there can be countries with different value systems in the military block, and being a member of CSTO, is not obligatory to observe a Russian value system. It is also unclear why NATO is unconditionallycontrasted with CSTO. This is cold war inertia and nothing more. What prevents us from cooperating with NATO, while being a member of CSTO? In reality, this is the case: Armenia’s joint military exercises withNATO are not inferior to the military exercises within CSTO, in terms of quantity and quality.

In conclusion, a rhetorical question: Does NATO want to have two more conflicting members (Armenia and Azerbaijan)? Even the membership of the apparently pro-western Georgia to NATO is not noticed in the visible future, although Georgians have been openly speaking about their wish to join NATO for at least 7-8 years. In that case, why do we think that we will be welcomed with open arms, with an unresolved conflict? Even if there were countries within NATO who would be willing to support Armenia’s membership, won’t there be others, who will block it?

Thus Armenia’s membership to NATO is rather blurred for reasons independent from us. That potential membership is connected with several controversial issues and serious expenses. Instead the membership to CSTO provides an opportunity for preserving the balance of power in the region at minimal cost. At the same time, close cooperation with NATO derives from our interests and is necessary in terms of improving and increasing the effectiveness of our armed forces, reducing corruption risks, peacekeeping missions, and military education.

Source: www.razm.info